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INSIDER TRADING: COULD 
LEGISLATION BE THE SOLUTION? 
Susan Fox 
"I'm about to tell you something I'm not supposed to 
tell anyone," says Harold, a former 1960s hippie and now 
successful manufacturer of running shoes. Harold is out 
running with a less-successful former college buddy and 
wants to help him. He reveals that his very small company 
will shortly be bought out by a large conglomerate. '11ny-
one who has our stock is going to triple their money," 
Harold continues. "By telling you this, I have just violated 
about sixteen regulations of the Securities (and) Exchange 
Commission, so don 't repeat it. " 
-Scene from "The Big Chill" 
(as quoted in Dun's Business Month, June 1984). 
Introduction 
According to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Harold broke the law; but to most 
people insider trading differs from obvious 
crimes of violence or theft except in the sense 
that it is both illegal and unethical. Harold 
reminds us of the SEC's success in raising cor-
porate consciousness about the illegality of 
insider trading, as well as its failure in chang-
ing the attitudes necessary to stop it. As former 
SEC attorney Harvey Pitt of Fried, Frank, 
Harris, Shriver, and Kampelman, puts it, "In-
sider trading is a way of life today. The problem 
is that people do not have any real fear" 
(Hershman, p. 49). 
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If most people feel this way, why not just 
make insider trading legal? The main reason 
given for keeping insider trading illegal is that 
it puts the average man on the street at a severe 
disadvantage. The theory is that in order to 
have an efficient stock market, one in which 
everyone operates with the same information, 
all trades must be based on public information 
that is available to any investor who wants it. 
The concept is better known as the "parity of 
information" theory, which holds that every-
one should have an equal chance at acquiring 
the same information. 
Insider trading is considered unaccept-
able conduct because by playing the market 
with nonpublic information, employers and 
clients are deceived, sellers of the target's stock 
who believe they are trading in a fair market are 
deceived, and exchange specialists and market 
makers can be financially ruined (Prentice, p. 
62). It's much like a poker game played with 
marked cards. The person who owns the cards 
knows exactly what is going on- when to fold, 
when to bluff, and when to keep raising the 
pot- while the rest of the players know only 
what is in their hands. This view holds that 
insider trading is cheating and it is wrong. 
On the other hand, legalizing insider trad-
ing might make the market more efficient and 
more reflective of actual business dealings. 
Some experts argue that it would help get 
information out into the open much faster, all 
due to the fact that people would be more apt to 
trade on such information. Since the public 
would have more information, it would be able 
to trade and invest more efficiently. 
The current state of the law has not been 
sufficient to deter people from trading on in-
sider information, mainly because there is not a 
clear-cut definition of the crime. The SEC and 
Congress, to date, have been unwilling to de-
fine insider trading for fear of creating loop-
holes. Though at the time of this writing bills 
have been proposed which include such a defi-
nition, they are far from becoming law. Simple 
justice seems to demand that if the SEC and 
the courts are unable or unwilling to define the 
crime of insider trading, then prosecutors 
should stop bringing charges on that basis. 
This would remove the uncertainty in the cur-
rent system. 
The purpose of this article is to examine 
the current system of insider trading enforce-
ment. The article will also discuss the argu-
ments-pro and con-concerning the legali-
zation of insider trading. While to most people 
legalizing insider trading may not be the best 
solution, the arguments brought to light should 
be seriously considered in helping to find a 
solution to the problem of enforcing the crime 
of insider trading. 
Definition of Insider Trading-The 
Traditional View 
Historically, the SEC has opposed the 
enactment of a statutory definition of the crime 
of insider trading for fear of giving defense 
attorneys opportunities to evade the law. For-
mer SEC chairman J.R Shad reiterated this 
position when discussing the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984: 
In order to reach unforeseen fact pat-
terns, any definition would have to be 
very broad. The flexibility which is 
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gained by basing the imposition of 
the (penalty) on existing case law 
avoids the problem of freezing into 
law either a definition which is too 
broad, or too narrow to deal with new-
ly emerging issues (Tidwell, p. 93). 
Traditionally, the courts have held that 
insider trading is the trading of securities while 
in possession of material non-public informa-
tion in violation of a fiduciary duty. This duty 
requires loyalty to the shareholders. If the ac-
cused is found not to have any such relation-
ship to the shareholders with whom he deals, 
he will not be convicted of insider trading. This 
fiduciary duty was at the core of the traditional 
view. However, as will be discussed below, this 
view is changing. 
Congress had the opportunity to define 
insider trading with the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act. Instead it followed Shad's advice and 
left the defining to the judiciary. However, de-
spite this reluctance to define the crime, the 
SEC still emphasizes that this is a "prime area 
of concern and a principal target of its enforce-
ment activities" (Farley, p. 1771). 
Robert A Prentice explains Congress' op-
position to insider trading by claiming that 
statements in the House Report of the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act implied that Congress is 
against insider trading, including that done by 
outsiders. Outsiders are those who do not have 
a direct duty to the shareholders. As Prentice 
goes on to say: 
Such statements, coupled with the 
facts that Congress (1) greatly in-
creased the sanctions for insider trad-
ing, (2) ignored calls for specific 
definitional legislation, and (3) had 
knowledge that the lower courts had 
expanded the scope of the ban on 
inside trading to include many cat-
egories of outsiders, indicate that, at 
the very least, Congress has no strong 
objection to this extension (Prentice, 
p. 58). 
The extension of which he speaks involves the 
fact that the courts have begun to expand the 
notion of insider trading to include outsiders. 
No longer is it necessary to have a fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders in order to be convict-
ed of insider trading. 
As was mentioned above, the bulk of cur-
rent insider-trading law has been created by 
court case precedents. For example, though the 
liability of insiders has not changed substan-
tially, the potential liability of outsiders has 
greatly increased as a result of such key cases as 
Dirks, Chiarella, Newman, and Lund. How-
ever, this liability depends both on how and 
from whom the information was obtained, as 
illustrated by the following: 
An outsider who trades on inside in-
formation obtained from an insider 
who breached a fiduciary duty in dis-
closing it, has tippee liability under 
Dirks. An outsider who trades on in-
sider information obtained from an 
insider who disclosed the informa-
tion for a legitimate commercial rea-
son obtains Lund temporary insider 
status and its attendant liabilities, if 
the disclosure carried an expectation 
of confidentiality. An outsider who 
misappropriates or steals inside in-
formation, rather than receiving it 
from an insider, is also liable (at least 
criminally and in an SEC injunctive 
action) under Newman. Only the out-
sider who obtains the information by 
his own legitimate devices such as an 
investment adviser who does his 
homework is clearly not liable (Pren-
tice, p. 57). 
For clarification purposes, the following 
examples are provided to illustrate each of the 
above cases: 
• If the CEO of Acme, Inc. tells Joe, his best 
friend, of a proposed merger with another 
company, Joe will have tippee liability un-
der Dirks if he trades on this information. 
Simply stated, if one receives a tip and has 
reason to believe the information is material 
nonpublic information, and if he subse-
quently trades on it, that person can be 
held liable. 
• If Joe, a professional accountant, receives 
the same information when consulting with 
Acme, Inc. about a related project, Joe as-
sumes temporary insider status and would 
be liable under Lund. 
• If, while waiting inside the office of the CEO 
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of Acme, Inc., Joe looks through notes on 
his desk, finds information regarding the 
merger, and subsequently trades on it, he 
will be liable under Newman. 
The above examples may still give a false 
sense of certainty, however; for the courts are 
still not of one mind with respect to the cir-
cumstances under which individuals might be 
held liable. This, of course, is part and parcel of 
our judicial system: its ability to constantly 
adapt a law to changing circumstances. How-
ever, how can corporate insiders and outsiders 
be expected to take seriously a crime that Con-
gress and the SEC have been afraid to define? 
"No one is dragged into court on a charge of 
insider trading; instead they are charged with 
securities fraud. The securities laws do not 
explicitly say what is and what is not insider 
trading. People can not be sure whether they 
are committing a crime or just being astute" 
(Frank, p. 80). 
If insider trading is to be considered il-
legal, then something more than a hodgepodge 
of "hypotheticals" developed from case law is 
needed. The public deserves more specific in-
sider trading legislation so as to be able to 
understand what is and is not permissible. 
Arguments in Favor of Insider-
Trading Laws 
It is true that the majority of people be-
lieve insider trading should remain illegal. For 
instance, as Democratic Congressman Timothy 
Wirth of Colorado says, "Insider trading threat-
ens these markets by undermining the public's 
expectations of honest and fair securities mar-
kets, where all participants play by the same 
rules" (Hershman, p. 50). And as Democratic 
Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin says of 
insider trading, "I can't think of anything more 
destructive of confidence in the markets" 
(Hershman, p. 50). 
What is said and implied is that insider 
trading is an area of serious concern, and that 
both the SEC and Congress believe that some-
thing must be done about it. At the current 
time, Congress and the SEC are finally taking 
some positive steps toward cracking down. Our-
ing the latter half of 1987, proposals for a new 
insider trading law surfaced- proposals which 
include a specific definition of the crime. Both 
the Senate and the SEC have submitted pro-
posals to Congress. The proposals are nearly 
identical, except for some minor differences. 
Under the SEC's proposal a person is engaged 
in illegal insider trading if he "knows or 
recklessly disregards that such information has 
been obtained wrongfully or that such pur-
chase or sale would constitute a wrongful use 
of such information" (Robb, p. 34). "Wrong-
fully obtained" is defined as having been ob-
tained via "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, 
electronic espionage" or through a "breach of 
any fiduciary, contractual, employment, per-
sonal or other relationship" (Robb, p. 34). 
The above does not in any sense consti-
tute a revision of SEC thinking. This proposal 
simply makes what is currently a matter of 
unclear case law into well-defined securities 
law. As the SEC has described the purpose of its 
proposal, "The proposed legislative definition 
of insider trading is intended to distinguish 
wrongful chicanery from legitimate competi-
tion and to preclude foul play while protecting 
fair play" (Sterngold, p. D8). This definition 
appears to do just that. 
If the above definition is accepted, there 
should no longer be any doubt as to what con-
stitutes insider trading. People would no long-
er have to operate in a cloud of confusion. 
Furthermore, it is a definition that, if passed, 
should lead to more convictions, especially in 
cases where the evidence is present but the 
current law is vague. This new definition, 
though, will not necessarily increase the per-
centage of violators who are apprehended. It is 
common knowledge that insider trading is so 
widespread that only a small percentage of 
wrongdoers are ever detected (Prentice, p. 61). 
What is required is not only a clear definition of 
the crime, but an improved detection system 
as well. 
The fact remains that many people will 
probably continue to trade on inside informa-
tion even with new legislation. The only way 
things will change is with an improved detec-
tion system; improved regulation is not going 
to be sufficient. One observer, Attorney Harvey 
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Pitt, has said that he would be surprised if the 
SEC is currently catching more than twenty 
percent of the cases (Hershman, p. 55). The 
computers only send off an alarm when there is 
a significantly high volume of stock traded or 
when a stock's price moves up and down at an 
unusually rapid pace. The New York Stock Ex-
change's Stock Watch computers, which mon-
itor all New York Stock Exchange-traded stocks, 
flag hundreds of trades each day as being of the 
"unusual" variety. The Stock Watch Depart-
ment attempts to investigate these transac-
tions, but usually ends up eliminating virtually 
all of them from suspicion, for whatever reason. 
In cases where the Department does believe 
that an unusual trade has come about because 
of trading on insider information, it notifies the 
SEC (Cleeton). Usually, though, it will only be 
the "greedy" ones who are caught. 
Prentice has argued that the increased 
sanctions brought about by the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984 may well increase de-
terrence, but that no one expects the problem 
to disappear. "More deterrence, not less," he 
claims, "is needed" (Prentice, p. 61). At the 
time of this writing, however, insider trading 
seems to have grown substantially since 
Prentice's article was written (1985). But what 
form of greater deterrence is needed if, as Pren-
tice stated, "only a small percentage of (insider 
trading) is ever detected?" (Prentice, p. 61). If 
having to return triple one's ill-gotten gains-
as the penalties laid down in the Act require-
is not sufficiently deterring, then perhaps ex-
tended prison sentences for such crimes 
should be considered. The proposed regula-
tion's main purpose is to (at last) define insider 
trading; but that, by itself, will not rid the sys-
tem of the problem. Because of the SEC's 
flawed detection system, it will only succeed in 
catching those who are not satisfied with only 
modest gains. The thinking seems to be that if 
one simply covers his tracks carefully, there is 
nothing to worry about. 
The proposed legislation is probably very 
nearly what is needed to secure insider trading 
convictions. However, as mentioned before, 
the system of detection- therefore enforce-
ment-could be improved greatly. But, to de-
vise a more sensitive detection system similar 
to what the stock exchanges now have and to 
still be able to distinguish between fair and foul 
play may be an insunnountable task. 
Arguments Against Insider-Trading 
Laws 
Some legal scholars and market academi-
cians, rather than applauding the SEC for its 
investigative skill, have proposed that insider 
trading be made legal. By removing the restric-
tions, they say, insiders would act more quick-
ly, and such infonnation would flow rapidly 
into the marketplace. That, in tum, would put 
the public on a more equal footing with in-
siders. "Insider trading would not only make 
the markets fairer, but also more efficient," says 
Stephen Figlewski, Professor of Finance at 
New York University's School of Business. He 
adds, "There are always going to be people who 
have infonnation that the average guy does not 
have. The idea is to get it into the open faster" 
(Frank, p. 81). 
Mostpeoplewouldcounterwith the argu-
ment that legalizing insider trading would 
frighten the average investor away, leaving the 
trading to corporations and market-wise "big-
wigs." However, insider trading is so wide-
spread at this time, with only a small fraction of 
violators ever caught, that many potential in-
vestors may already be wary of participating. 
Also, it must be said that many small investors 
who do play the market tend to buy their stocks 
and hold for the long-tenn. Because of this, 
such investors are probably less likely to be 
affected by short-tenn shocks resulting from 
trading on inside infonnation. But with the 
legalization of insider trading, the average in-
vestor could then ask his "friendly neighbor-
hood corporate executive" for a tip without 
either of them having to worry about the au-
thorities. This might, in tum, prompt many 
more potential investors to look to the market. 
Mter all, infonnation is the "raw material for 
the securities business, and those who find it 
first and use it best will reap the benefits" 
(Frank, p. 88). 
One observer, John Boland, believes that 
current regulation has strayed somewhat from 
its purpose of investor protection. He com-
ments that the proposed legislation now in 
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Congress would insist on "inequality." As 
Boland states: 
If the rationale for regulation is spe-
cious, the argument that investors 
benefit from the SEC's specific rules 
has even less merit. The business of 
regulating the flow of infonnation to 
the stock market is the business of 
keeping secrets from the market. If 
people possessing material infonna-
tion are barred from using it in the 
market, prices will less accurately re-
flect business realities. An investor or 
pension fund that sells Republic Air 
into a market where the buyout is 
being whispered gets a better deal 
than if Northwest's plans are known 
only to Northwest (Boland). 
Yet, according to the SEC, keeping infor-
mation and participants on the sidelines im-
proves the market's efficiency and integrity, 
and keeping investors in the dark protects 
them. It is not clear why the SEC holds this 
view. According to Boland, the SEC seems to 
believe that the brokerage house trader who 
sees the first public word over a newswire (a 
privilege only because of his vocation ) is more 
entitled to profit from such a development than 
a short order cook in Des Moines whose brother 
works at Northwest. The SEC's main purpose 
does not seem to be either investor protection 
or an efficient market, but narrower "regula-
tory muscle, staff, and budget" (Boland). This 
simply means that the SEC is often seen as 
more concerned with increasing its power and 
control over those who engage in illegal trad-
ing as opposed to paying attention to what 
would really help the market and its par-
ticipants. 
Another reason which is sometimes of-
fered for legalizing insider trading involves the 
suggestion of an alternative method of deter-
rence. Very few individuals or financial institu-
tions like the idea of expending substantial 
sums in defense costs in the investigative, trial, 
and appeal stages of an action where success is 
defined simply as a ruling saying that their 
conduct was not illegal, though perhaps un-
ethical, reprehensible, and otherwise disrepu-
table. The possibility of the latter detennina-
tion in itself serves as a sufficient deterrent for 
most institutions and results in voluntary in-
ternal prohibitions against such conduct by 
employees regardless of legal fine points 
(Farley, p. 1780). In fact most firms would 
rather deal with insider trading violations in-
ternally, without government intervention, re-
gardless of the state of insider trading's legal-
ity. According to this line of thinking, methods 
of deterrence, as well as punishment, should be 
left to the corporations. By legalizing insider 
trading and leaving the "police work" to the 
employers, the market could then become more 
efficient. Each company could regulate the 
type of information that it wished to release. If 
an employee violated this policy, the company 
could then deal with him/ her as it pleased. 
Matthew Farley is a strong supporter of this 
idea. He contends that "court action is un-
necessary because there are sufficient remedies 
available to any employer to deal with employ-
ee misbehavior without using such an event as 
an illogical linchpin of a securities law viola-
tion" (Farley, p. 1782). 
Farley argues further that certain anoma-
lies exist in the market, one of which is that 
"the employee who overhears the acquisition 
plans of high executives and then trades may 
be a misappropriator, but a nonemployee on 
the same facts is arguably not so labeled or so 
restricted" (Farley, p. 1781). Other would say 
that the "integrity of the marketplace" is not 
injured quite so much by someone taking ad-
vantage of material non public information ac-
cidentally overheard as it is by an intentional, 
fraudulent misappropriation (Prentice, p. 67). 
Whether the latter statement is true or not is 
difficult to say. In either case, the person is 
trading on information which is confidential. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, both trades are 
illegal. The marketplace does not "see" who 
trades, but rather only what they trade and the 
consequent effect on the stock's price. 
In the opinion of many, investor confi-
dence in the securities markets does not de-
pend upon an absolute parity of information, 
but only upon the lack of significant fraudu-
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lent conduct (Prentice, p. 67). Insider trading 
could be made legal, efficiency could be in-
creased, and the market could be totally free of 
fraudulent conduct; but the average investor 
still would not have access to all the informa-
tion that brokers have. This being the case, 
investors may still be intimidated because they 
know others have significant information to 
which they simply do not have access. This will 
always remain a problem, regardless of the legal 
status of insider trading. 
Conclusion 
Insider trading is illegal. Yet, it is-and 
will probably remain- a crime with an ex-
tremely low detection rate. What is the public 
to do? Stronger sanctions have failed. To date, 
the SEC and Congress have refused to pass 
legislation offering a precise definition of the 
crime. But even if such legislation is passed, it 
is doubtful that people will be deterred by it. 
Also, many small investors today are reluctant 
to invest, not knowing what others know. 
Since insider trading seems rampant right 
now, making insider trading legal might not 
make a difference to the small investor, espe-
cially when the SEC is only able to catch the 
Chiarellas, the Dirks, and the Winans- only a 
small fraction of the total number of suspected 
violators. Insider trading is everywhere, and 
the small investor knows it. Public confidence, 
therefore, will not be restored through invok-
ing tougher penalties, but only through im-
proved detection and enforcement. 
As this writer sees it, in order to be fair to 
the average investor and to keep insider trading 
illegal, the only apparent option the SEC has is 
an improved detection system. But since that 
seems almost impossible to effect, perhaps it 
should consider legalizing insider trading. 
This would make it the responsibility of em-
ployers to make their own codes of ethics 
including reprimands should these codes b~ 
broken. 
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